2013年5月15日 星期三

台灣主要私立大學獲利能力分析



這篇ppt轉載很妙. 雖然"絀餘" (據說非盈利機構用) "盈餘"等混用.



以下資訊以各校公布之會計師查核報告的收支絀餘表內所公告的當期絀餘資訊為準, 主要為經常門絀餘,提供大家參考一下,105 年的大浪將來,誰的口袋比較深。
 (單位:百萬)
            100學年度 99學年度 98學年度 三年平均 學生人數 每生盈餘(元)

淡江大學 174.38 158.32 130.68 154.46             29000         5326
文化大學 165.62 1.95 276.39 147.98 27000 5481
銘傳大學 211.32 188.97 313.66 237.98 19000 12525
世新大學 61.56 102.57 67.23 77.12 11600 6648
東吳大學 96.01 110.02 168.23 124.75 15900 7846
東海大學 375.93 304.36 307.81 329.36 17400 18929
逢甲大學 125.05 79.51 178.29 127.61 20800 6135
元智大學 158.53 169.88 93.59 140.666 9900 14209
長庚大學 291.99 882.68 91.30 421.99 7600 55525
中原大學 -7.79 153.52 171.17 105.63 16300 6481
義守大學 95.00 124.00 203.00 140.66 15600 9017
輔仁大學 47.96 186.26 260.03 164.75 26900 6125
靜宜大學 37.49 26.54 57.46 40.49 12400 3266
實踐大學 43.00 206.00 -182.00 22.33 15700 1423
亞洲大學 239.50 332.96 416.92 329.79 11200 29446
長榮大學 98.50 59.74 72.49 76.91 10100 7615
大葉大學 215.41 50.62 127.71 131.24 10200 12867
大同大學 26.47 -51.23 101.28 25.20 5100 5001 (單位:百萬) 100學年度 99學年度 98學年度 三年平均 學生人數 每生盈餘(元)
 台北醫學* 394.24 704.56 608.36 569.05 6031 94354
高雄醫學* 281.44 428.75 408.10 372.76 6935 53751
中國醫大* 1252.14 963.80 1192.35 1136.09 7520 151076
中山醫大* 754.93 68.25 18.32 280.50 7500 37400
佛光大學 187.95 9.14 79.62 92.23 3198 28841
慈濟大學 123.23 447.57 993.08 521.29 3300 157967
華梵大學 -18.45 -12.59 6.52 -8.17 3807 -2146
南華大學 -20.20 9.62 40.58 10.00 5500 1818
玄奘大學 75.62 107.82 136.71 106.71 6300 16939
真理大學 -75.30 -45.26 7.40 -37.72 9252 -4076
台首大學 19.99 -109.71 -12.12 -33.94 5229 -6491
明道大學 25.18 -44.67 161.96 47.49 6300 7538
興國學院 -75.75 -56.73 -47.04 -59.84 880 -68000
稻江學院 -86.00 -33.00 -37.00 -52.00 2700 -19259
康寧大學 -5.38 8.06 -16.27 -4.53 2900 -1562
開南大學 126.32 25.64 261.96 137.97 10000 13797
中華大學 1.89 30.98 49.84 27.57 8614 3200
*醫學大學部分不包含醫院營運。

-- ※ 發信站: 批踢踢實業坊(ptt.cc) ◆ From: 114.34.208.140
→ francej:長庚賺很大 是因為學費較貴 教育部補助比較多 還是董事有 05/14 23:26
→ francej:錢又會投資 ? 05/14 23:26
→ prior:我個人比較意外的是亞洲。 05/14 23:28
→ uka123ily:亞洲這幾年也是氣勢很旺。 05/14 23:42
→ BColangelo:長庚是私校學費便宜的前幾名 應是頂大補助+醫院捐助 05/14 23:47
→ connaitre:有些私立大學給學生的資源不見得比國立名校差 05/14 23:48
→ prior:小八卦,不少學校的現金結餘(含銀行存款)超過十五億。 05/14 23:50
推 xmanxpower:有其他學校的嗎 謝謝 05/14 23:56
推 flac:長庚大學有來自醫院的回饋 05/15 00:14
→ flac:據說全台灣最有錢的私校是台塑三校 05/15 00:15
推 flac:經費來自多年來王老先生的捐贈與股份 05/15 00:17
推 dbspvj:長庚每年固定比例會有醫院的補助款,所以很有錢,看他們給 05/15 00:35
→ dbspvj:老師的福利和薪資全台灣第一就知道了。但是相對於老大哥, 05/15 00:36
→ dbspvj:小老弟明志就窮了,所以之前明志的老師有在抗議待遇不公 05/15 00:36
→ dbspvj:似乎明志因為王家分家的關西無法拿到長庚醫院的補助款,這 05/15 00:37
→ dbspvj:部分不是很清楚要請高手補充 05/15 00:37
→ pmesonofsun:長庚校務基金300億,加上近年醫院、處分台塑股票,孳 05/15 00:43
→ pmesonofsun:息 加總起來已經遠超過300E 05/15 00:43
→ blence:亞洲應該是跟中國醫連動的 05/15 00:48
推 s75287:沒有大同XD 05/15 04:47
補上大同。
推 usual:推!!O不知道有沒有北醫及高醫等有醫學院的私校資料呢?感恩! 05/15 09:24
推 Paulsen:推亞洲令人意外~ 05/15 09:30
推 jahomekuo:不意外 剛剛去郵局 看到有位同學 在記入學申請 看到霧峰 05/15 10:12
→ jahomekuo:應該是亞洲大學 05/15 10:12
推 fatfox:表列每生盈餘超過9000元的學費通通不許漲!!XD 05/15 10:35
推 limingche:實踐很意外..手頭這麼緊? 05/15 12:19
推 puec2:我不太懂 這不是表示學生待遇不好的意思嗎? 05/15 13:02
→ puec2:另外盈餘這麼多 為什麼國家還要補助這些學校? 05/15 13:02
推 limingche:to 樓上,因為是競爭型預算啊..就像5y500e的學校都不缺錢 05/15 13:23
推 micklin:puec2你的講法就像是「當大學老師賺那麼多,為什麼要扣 05/15 13:44
→ micklin:抵所得稅?」 05/15 13:44
→ micklin:盈餘與學生待遇沒有負相關. 捨得花就是會花, 捨不得花就是 05/15 13:46
→ micklin:不會花. 富爸爸也會有窮小孩,窮爸爸也會有衣食不缺的小孩. 05/15 13:47
推 uka123ily:\應該說是越申請越缺錢 05/15 15:36
→ prior:醫學大學已經補上囉。 05/15 17:04
私立大學應該都齊全了。
→ prior:私立大學應該都齊全了。抓片的時間順便找了一下。 05/15 17:41
推 uka123ily:馬偕? 05/15 18:22
→ prior:馬偕設立時間太短。 05/15 18:33
※ 編輯: prior 來自: 1.34.18.249 (05/15 18:55)
推 hohancdr:誰可以解釋一下甚麼是"每生盈餘"? 怎麼計算? 05/15 19:19
推 smartken:這資料怎麼coding出來的?@@ 05/15 19:54
→ prior:每生盈餘就是把三年平均盈餘除以學生人數。 05/15 21:11
→ prior:coding資料來自於各校的會計室的會計師查核報告或者是財務 05/15 21:11
→ prior:資訊公開區,這是公開資料,花時間而已。 05/15 21:11
推 jack5756:推P大的研究精神 05/15 22:30
推 honey823:慈濟第一? 有點意外 05/16 08:49
→ fifs:中國醫的收入這麼的高??? 連續第一? 台中沒醫院嗎? 05/16 09:58
推 belleville2:東海不是之前傳說財務不太理想嗎? 05/16 10:12
推 limingche:中國醫在台中名氣很響亮喔,算是口碑好的醫院! 05/16 12:33 
 
 
  以下資訊以各校公布之會計師查核報告的收支絀餘表內所公告的當期絀餘資訊為準, 主要為經常門絀餘,提供大家參考一下,105 年的大浪將來,誰的口袋比較深。 (單位:百萬) 100學年度 99學年度 98學年度 三年平均 學生人數 每生盈餘(元) 淡江大學 174.38 158.32 130.68 154.46 29000 5326 文化大學 165.62 1.95 276.39 147.98 27000 5481 銘傳大學 211.32 188.97 313.66 237.98 19000 12525 世新大學 61.56 102.57 67.23 77.12 11600 6648 東吳大學 96.01 110.02 168.23 124.75 15900 7846 東海大學 375.93 304.36 307.81 329.36 17400 18929 逢甲大學 125.05 79.51 178.29 127.61 20800 6135 元智大學 158.53 169.88 93.59 140.666 9900 14209 長庚大學 291.99 882.68 91.30 421.99 7600 55525 中原大學 -7.79 153.52 171.17 105.63 16300 6481 義守大學 95.00 124.00 203.00 140.66 15600 9017 輔仁大學 47.96 186.26 260.03 164.75 26900 6125 靜宜大學 37.49 26.54 57.46 40.49 12400 3266 實踐大學 43.00 206.00 -182.00 22.33 15700 1423 亞洲大學 239.50 332.96 416.92 329.79 11200 29446 長榮大學 98.50 59.74 72.49 76.91 10100 7615 大葉大學 215.41 50.62 127.71 131.24 10200 12867 大同大學 26.47 -51.23 101.28 25.20 5100 5001 (單位:百萬) 100學年度 99學年度 98學年度 三年平均 學生人數 每生盈餘(元) 台北醫學* 394.24 704.56 608.36 569.05 6031 94354 高雄醫學* 281.44 428.75 408.10 372.76 6935 53751 中國醫大* 1252.14 963.80 1192.35 1136.09 7520 151076 中山醫大* 754.93 68.25 18.32 280.50 7500 37400 佛光大學 187.95 9.14 79.62 92.23 3198 28841 慈濟大學 123.23 447.57 993.08 521.29 3300 157967 華梵大學 -18.45 -12.59 6.52 -8.17 3807 -2146 南華大學 -20.20 9.62 40.58 10.00 5500 1818 玄奘大學 75.62 107.82 136.71 106.71 6300 16939 真理大學 -75.30 -45.26 7.40 -37.72 9252 -4076 台首大學 19.99 -109.71 -12.12 -33.94 5229 -6491 明道大學 25.18 -44.67 161.96 47.49 6300 7538 興國學院 -75.75 -56.73 -47.04 -59.84 880 -68000 稻江學院 -86.00 -33.00 -37.00 -52.00 2700 -19259 康寧大學 -5.38 8.06 -16.27 -4.53 2900 -1562 開南大學 126.32 25.64 261.96 137.97 10000 13797 中華大學 1.89 30.98 49.84 27.57 8614 3200 *醫學大學部分不包含醫院營運。
 
 
 

2013年5月14日 星期二

Rickover speech at Columbia University in 1982



十幾年前我的一位朋友修臺灣大學的EMBA課程
現在另外一位年輕朋友加入 (每屆百來人分三組)
就用此網頁祝福此位總經理:


Powell在此書結尾處引用了前海軍上將李高佛的話:“光有機構無法完成任務,光有計劃和大綱也無法完成任務,真正能完成任務的是人。機構、計劃和大綱的好壞只能促 進或阻礙人們完成任務的進程。”


 海曼·G.·李高佛(Hyman G. Rickover,1900年1月27日-1986年7月8日) ,人稱「核動力海軍之父」(Father of the Nuclear Navy),是美國海軍上將。美國海軍學院畢業,於美國海軍研究所(Naval Postgraduate School)得物理碩士,並曾於哥倫比亞大學研究物理學。

Hyman G. Rickover - Wikiquote



 Rickover speech at Columbia University in 1982

Doing a Job


By Adm. Hyman G. Rickover
 
Admiral Hyman Rickover (1900-1986), the “Father of the Nuclear Navy,” was one of the most successful—and controversial- public managers of the 20th Century. His accomplishments are the stuff of legend. For example, in three short years, Rickover’s team designed and built the first nuclear submarine—the Nautilus—an amazing feat of engineering given that it involved the development of the first use of a controlled nuclear reactor. The Nautilus not only transformed submarine warfare, but also laid the groundwork for a whole fleet of nuclear aircraft carriers and cruisers (which was also built by Rickover and his team).

The text below is an excerpt from a speech Rickover delivered at Columbia University in 1982, in which he succinctly outlined his management philosophy. His determination, clarity of purpose, emphasis on developing his people, high standards, and willingness to give his people ownership of their work had to have been very inspiring. He had exceptionally high standards and was known to take some of these same strengths to extremes, however, which no doubt led to his reputation in some circles as being difficult to work for. On that cautionary note, GovLeaders.org is pleased to present Rickover’s own description of his management style.

Human experience shows that people, not organizations or management systems, get things done. For this reason, subordinates must be given authority and responsibility early in their careers. In this way they develop quickly and can help the manager do his work. The manager, of course, remains ultimately responsible and must accept the blame if subordinates make mistakes.

As subordinates develop, work should be constantly added so that no one can finish his job. This serves as a prod and a challenge. It brings out their capabilities and frees the manager to assume added responsibilities. As members of the organization become capable of assuming new and more difficult duties, they develop pride in doing the job well. This attitude soon permeates the entire organization.

One must permit his people the freedom to seek added work and greater responsibility. In my organization, there are no formal job descriptions or organizational charts. Responsibilities are defined in a general way, so that people are not circumscribed. All are permitted to do as they think best and to go to anyone and anywhere for help. Each person then is limited only by his own ability.

Complex jobs cannot be accomplished effectively with transients. Therefore, a manager must make the work challenging and rewarding so that his people will remain with the organization for many years. This allows it to benefit fully from their knowledge, experience, and corporate memory.

The Defense Department does not recognize the need for continuity in important jobs. It rotates officer every few years both at headquarters and in the field. The same applies to their civilian superiors.

This system virtually ensures inexperience and nonaccountability. By the time an officer has begun to learn a job, it is time for him to rotate. Under this system, incumbents can blame their problems on predecessors. They are assigned to another job before the results of their work become evident. Subordinates cannot be expected to remain committed to a job and perform effectively when they are continuously adapting to a new job or to a new boss.

When doing a job—any job—one must feel that he owns it, and act as though he will remain in the job forever. He must look after his work just as conscientiously, as though it were his own business and his own money. If he feels he is only a temporary custodian, or that the job is just a stepping stone to a higher position, his actions will not take into account the long-term interests of the organization. His lack of commitment to the present job will be perceived by those who work for him, and they, likewise, will tend not to care. Too many spend their entire working lives looking for their next job. When one feels he owns his present job and acts that way, he need have no concern about his next job.

In accepting responsibility for a job, a person must get directly involved. Every manager has a personal responsibility not only to find problems but to correct them. This responsibility comes before all other obligations, before personal ambition or comfort.

A major flaw in our system of government, and even in industry, is the latitude allowed to do less than is necessary. Too often officials are willing to accept and adapt to situations they know to be wrong. The tendency is to downplay problems instead of actively trying to correct them. Recognizing this, many subordinates give up, contain their views within themselves, and wait for others to take action. When this happens, the manager is deprived of the experience and ideas of subordinates who generally are more knowledgeable than he in their particular areas.

A manager must instill in his people an attitude of personal responsibility for seeing a job properly accomplished. Unfortunately, this seems to be declining, particularly in large organizations where responsibility is broadly distributed. To complaints of a job poorly done, one often hears the excuse, “I am not responsible.” I believe that is literally correct. The man who takes such a stand in fact is not responsible; he is irresponsible. While he may not be legally liable, or the work may not have been specifically assigned to him, no one involved in a job can divest himself of responsibility for its successful completion.

Unless the individual truly responsible can be identified when something goes wrong, no one has really been responsible. With the advent of modern management theories it is becoming common for organizations to deal with problems in a collective manner, by dividing programs into subprograms, with no one left responsible for the entire effort. There is also the tendency to establish more and more levels of management, on the theory that this gives better control. These are but different forms of shared responsibility, which easily lead to no one being responsible—a problems that often inheres in large corporations as well as in the Defense Department.

When I came to Washington before World War II to head the electrical section of the Bureau of Ships, I found that one man was in charge of design, another of production, a third handled maintenance, while a fourth dealt with fiscal matters. The entire bureau operated that way. It didn’t make sense to me. Design problems showed up in production, production errors showed up in maintenance, and financial matters reached into all areas. I changed the system. I made one man responsible for his entire area of equipment—for design, production, maintenance, and contracting. If anything went wrong, I knew exactly at whom to point. I run my present organization on the same principle.

A good manager must have unshakeable determination and tenacity. Deciding what needs to be done is easy, getting it done is more difficult. Good ideas are not adopted automatically. They must be driven into practice with courageous impatience. Once implemented they can be easily overturned or subverted through apathy or lack of follow-up, so a continuous effort is required. Too often, important problems are recognized but no one is willing to sustain the effort needed to solve them.
Nothing worthwhile can be accomplished without determination. In the early days of nuclear power, for example, getting approval to build the first nuclear submarine—the Nautilus—was almost as difficult as designing and building it. Many in the Navy opposed building a nuclear submarine.

In the same way, the Navy once viewed nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and cruisers as too expensive, despite their obvious advantages of unlimited cruising range and ability to remain at sea without vulnerable support ships. Yet today our nuclear submarine fleet is widely recognized as our nation’s most effective deterrent to nuclear war. Our nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and cruisers have proven their worth by defending our interests all over the world—even in remote trouble spots such as the Indian Ocean, where the capability of oil-fired ships would be severely limited by their dependence on fuel supplies.

The man in charge must concern himself with details. If he does not consider them important, neither will his subordinates. Yet “the devil is in the details.” It is hard and monotonous to pay attention to seemingly minor matters. In my work, I probably spend about ninety-nine percent of my time on what others may call petty details. Most managers would rather focus on lofty policy matters. But when the details are ignored, the project fails. No infusion of policy or lofty ideals can then correct the situation.

To maintain proper control one must have simple and direct means to find out what is going on. There are many ways of doing this; all involve constant drudgery. For this reason those in charge often create “management information systems” designed to extract from the operation the details a busy executive needs to know. Often the process is carried too far. The top official then loses touch with his people and with the work that is actually going on.

Attention to detail does not require a manager to do everything himself. No one can work more than twenty-four hours each day. Therefore to multiply his efforts, he must create an environment where his subordinates can work to their maximum ability. Some management experts advocate strict limits to the number of people reporting to a common superior—generally five to seven. But if one has capable people who require but a few moments of his time during the day, there is no reason to set such arbitrary constraints. Some forty key people report frequently and directly to me. This enables me to keep up with what is going on and makes it possible for them to get fast action. The latter aspect is particularly important. Capable people will not work for long where they cannot get prompt decisions and actions from their superior.

I require frequent reports, both oral and written, from many key people in the nuclear program. These include the commanding officers of our nuclear ships, those in charge of our schools and laboratories, and representatives at manufacturers’ plants and commercial shipyards. I insist they report the problems they have found directly to me—and in plain English. This provides them unlimited flexibility in subject matter—something that often is not accommodated in highly structured management systems—and a way to communicate their problems and recommendations to me without having them filtered through others. The Defense Department, with its excessive layers of management, suffers because those at the top who make decisions are generally isolated from their subordinates, who have the first-hand knowledge.

To do a job effectively, one must set priorities. Too many people let their “in” basket set the priorities. On any given day, unimportant but interesting trivia pass through an office; one must not permit these to monopolize his time. The human tendency is to while away time with unimportant matters that do not require mental effort or energy. Since they can be easily resolved, they give a false sense of accomplishment. The manager must exert self-discipline to ensure that his energy is focused where it is truly needed.

All work should be checked through an independent and impartial review. In engineering and manufacturing, industry spends large sums on quality control. But the concept of impartial reviews and oversight is important in other areas also. Even the most dedicated individual makes mistakes—and many workers are less than dedicated. I have seen much poor work and sheer nonsense generated in government and in industry because it was not checked properly.

One must create the ability in his staff to generate clear, forceful arguments for opposing viewpoints as well as for their own. Open discussions and disagreements must be encouraged, so that all sides of an issue will be fully explored. Further, important issues should be presented in writing. Nothing so sharpens the thought process as writing down one’s arguments. Weaknesses overlooked in oral discussion become painfully obvious on the written page.

When important decisions are not documented, one becomes dependent on individual memory, which is quickly lost as people leave or move to other jobs. In my work, it is important to be able to go back a number of years to determine the facts that were considered in arriving at a decision. This makes it easier to resolve new problems by putting them into proper perspective. It also minimizes the risk of repeating past mistakes. Moreover if important communications and actions are not documented clearly, one can never be sure they were understood or even executed.

It is a human inclination to hope things will work out, despite evidence or doubt to the contrary. A successful manager must resist this temptation. This is particularly hard if one has invested much time and energy on a project and thus has come to feel possessive about it. Although it is not easy to admit what a person once thought correct now appears to be wrong, one must discipline himself to face the facts objectively and make the necessary changes—regardless of the consequences to himself. The man in charge must personally set the example in this respect. He must be able, in effect, to “kill his own child” if necessary and must require his subordinates to do likewise. I have had to go to Congress and, because of technical problems, recommended terminating a project that had been funded largely on my say-so. It is not a pleasant task, but one must be brutally objective in his work.

No management system can substitute for hard work. A manager who does not work hard or devote extra effort cannot expect his people to do so. He must set the example. The manager may not be the smartest or the most knowledgeable person, but if he dedicates himself to the job and devotes the required effort, his people will follow his lead.

The ideas I have mentioned are not new—previous generations recognized the value of hard work, attention to detail, personal responsibility, and determination. And these, rather than the highly-touted modern management techniques, are still the most important in doing a job. Together they embody a common-sense approach to management, one that cannot be taught by professors of management in a classroom.

I am not against business education. A knowledge of accounting, finance, business law, and the like can be of value in a business environment. What I do believe is harmful is the impression often created by those who teach management that one will be able to manage any job by applying certain management techniques together with some simple academic rules of how to manage people and situations.


H.G. Rickover ©1982.